Sergey ERMAKOV,
Vladimir TERKHOV

Until the recent moment the defensive component of "European construction" process has been expressed less clearly although the West European Union (WEU) founded in 1954 became the first regional organization. The membership of the West-European countries in the military and political North-Atlantic Alliance that was in charge of these countries' defense during the Cold war slowed down the development of defensive "identity". Since the end of the Cold war the European defense "identity" was included once again in the "European construction" agenda as one of the major points. The European Union should have gradually taken on the central role in implementation of the defense "identity" concept. The EU ability to take independent decisions and actions doesn't mean, however, that future European army will have any autonomy, and shouldn't unjustifiably duplicate NATO.

Until now the UK and France acted as major military and political co-sponsors for the European Rapid Deployment Forces' creation. The first practical examination for the efficiency of the UE armed forces can be forthcoming shift of the NATO units in Kosovo for the "Eurocorps" peacekeeping units. Nevertheless, today is already mentioned that without further using the NATO command control systems the "Eurocorps" won't be able to withstand "serious fighting" if it suddenly emerges.

The financing of the European "defense identity" development becomes one of the key factors that will determine success or failure of this project. The decision-taken procedure about the beginning of military operation (by consensus or majority) remains unclear. The western expert say with one voice that the USA is a key factor that affects the realization of the European "defense identity" concept. In public statements the American officials usually appreciate the European efforts to take on the largest part of responsibility for the regional security and declare that it won't undermine NATO and exclude the USA and Canada from key security decision-making process. The "lack" of the US interest is explained by that two military and political structures are likely to compete in the European continent that will weaken NATO headed by the USA. For the Europeans the understanding of the asymmetrical nature of the defense relations between them and the American is evidently the most painful.

For the last decades just France (in close cooperation with Germany) played the leading role formulating the European interests and uniting the European countries under the EU aegis. France will try to fulfill its security and defense tasks in close cooperation with its European partners irrespective of the fact whether it will completely join the NATO structures or not.

The "continent" owes first of all Germany almost reached success in difficult process of its defense industry consolidation. Without adequate Germany's contribution Europe's defense "identity" process would have just failed. In order to make a significant contribution to the EU armed forces creation Germany can't reduce its defense budget further. It should be concentrated on radical restructuring of its armed forces what will increase their mobility, and on transition to voluntary manning.

In the UK the attitude of powerful public associations and changing each other governments to the defensive component of "the European construction" becomes evidently controversial. Since Labor Party won the parliamentary elections in spring 1998 those who supported the fastest joining to the developing "European construction" process including its military component have strengthened their positions. The UK would most possibly prefer the option of a force and equipment "toolbox" filled by the NATO members. The EU would get an access to this "toolbox" through a special consultation and decision-making procedures.