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Eksport Vooruzheniy Journal
¹4'2000 (July-August)
Analysis of NATO's Military Campaign Against Yugoslavia in Spring 1999

Vladimir Slipchenko,
Major-General in reserve,
Academician of the Academy of Military Science,
Doctor of Military Science,
Professor, Honored Scientist of the Russian Federation


During the NATO's military campaign against Yugoslavia the USA actually was conducting an experimental air, space and naval attack operation of new type - "Allied Power".


Within the first six weeks the USA independently and secretively from the other NATO countries tested the most advanced weapons and practiced new forms and methods of the new six generation war. During this period the economic and military targets in Serbia and Kosovo were attacked by the reconnaissance and attack battle systems created on the basis of the Navy and the Air Force groupings. The operation was conducted completely by non-contact methods. The Alliance didn't plan and conduct any ground battle actions on the Yugoslav territory. Being designed for the wars of the former generation the Yugoslav air defense happened to be completely helpless to repel the massive attacks of the high-accuracy winged missiles launched from the US ships and submarines or delivered to the launch points by the aircraft of the NATO countries. For the first time the United States tested the global war control system on the remote theatre of war directly from Pentagon. During the war in Yugoslavia the most important task for the USA and its allies was to test the new high-accuracy weapons, reconnaissance systems, control, communication and navigation systems, the radio-electronic counteraction, the logistics and the interaction of different forces and facilities.


In the second period of the operation the USA and the other NATO states actually have "returned" to the former generation of wars. The usual non-guided air bombs became the main weapons of the operation in that period. At that time the US Air Forces as well as the other NATO members started the regular battle training of the main and the reserve aircrews. These very pilots will serve within 10-15 more years i.e. in the period of the transition to the wars of the new generation.


In the result of the military campaign the European NATO members realized the scale of their lag behind the USA. The experience of the war in Yugoslavia will be used to reform the armed forces of the European countries for their adaptation to the wars of the new generation.


The operation proved that the Navy and the Air Forces would constitute the basis of the strategic attack forces in all future military conflicts. According to its capabilities by 2007-2010 the USA are expected to have the amount of high-accuracy air and sea-based non-piloted destruction weapons that will be sufficient to conduct a non-stop non-contact strategic air, space and naval attack operation within 30 days.


High-accuracy air and sea-based winged missiles and means of their delivery as well as navigation devices, control systems and anti-missile defense will be in demand on the arms market in the next years. The military and technical revolution will require changing not only the weapons but also the composition and the structure of the armed forces.

 

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