Anatoly Petrovich, tell us please about the foundation of the and its peculiarities. Do other countries have similar structures?

The Chief of Armaments service of the Armed Forces was finally formed on November 28th, 1929. The history of its foundation is tightly connected to the first five-years plans, the industrialization of the USSR, when the whole country turned to global planning and the Army began to rearm by modern armaments. The author of the idea to create such service was Mikhail Tukhachevsky. Under his plans the Red Army should found a uniting service that will develop perspective armaments programs for the Army. First of all it referred to the programs for creation of artillery, armored vehicles, aviation and shipbuilding. The service didn’t exist long and since these programs had been actuated at first it was transformed to the Department and then to the section of the General Staff. After the WW II the Service was revived several times and finally it was formed late in the 60’s when the started military revolution especially in technical equipment demanded more strict coordination and that was more important – all armaments unification and standardization. As armaments cost and complexity were growing it became urgently necessary to conduct united state military-technical and military-industrial policy, to coordinate such policy more strictly by the defense ministry, to distribute facilities wisely.

For this purpose the position of deputy Defense Minister - of the Armed Forces was created. Besides the Army and the Navy the Armed Forces also included military units of other power organizations. That’s why the Chief of Armaments office had duty to coordinate strictly the customer-organizations activities in the field of AME development, testing, production and operation. The major task was to provide all power organizations with unified ammunition list, unified calibers, unified system of legislative documents, operation, maintenance. Besides in the middle of the 60’s big work on all-union products list started. Thirty six items out of one hundred and fifteen included in the list referred to the military products. The Chief of Armaments office dealt with all above-mentioned issues.

Speaking about pre-Soviet history the Service existed in different forms in the Army since the times of Ivan III. It was the Artillery house, then the Artillery board, the Department of Armaments and the Engineering Department, the Main Artillery Department, founded in 1862, then the Main Department of Engineering Armaments. The similar structures were founded practically in all armies in the world, for example in the USA – DARPA, in France – DGA. By the way, to my opinion the latter is extremely efficient and for many reasons a unique structure. The General Armaments Direction of France provides the troops with armaments and military equipment but also manages the military industry, coordinates and conducts the military and technical cooperation. Besides the DGA includes armaments inspection and nuclear inspection and also own financial and economic department on all-above-mentioned affaires. Approximately the same structure has been lately founded in China. We as always remain behind although the preparations in this direction were done some years ago.

The potential of the Russian military industry and science is believed to have decreased for the last decade. Do you share this point of view? To what extent can the Russian military-industrial complex ensure the security of the country?

We have really lost the part of our potential but we should remember that the giant superfluous industrial and engineering facilities were built in the USSR. Russia inherited about 70% of the Soviet defense industry but now the considerable part of it aren’t demanded. Russia doesn’t need the facilities to produce 3,5 thousands of tanks and 4,5 thousands of self-propelled artillery units a year. Either the Soviet industry or the modern military-industrial complex resemble a puff pie: the perspective technologies existed next to the production of the first and the second generations armaments. Russia inherited many out-of-date plants. That’s why the restructarization and the integration of the plants and the research organizations are being conducted now.

In cooperation with the Ministry of Economy and together with the general customers the Chief of Armaments office took part in preparation of the industry restructurization program. In particular we were the first who propose to reduce the number of the military-industrial plants from 1746 to 1100 and then to 650 enlarged and integrated structures. In Russia besides defense plants the Ministry of  Atomic Energy has perfect enterprises where the general level of production facilities development is higher then at an average over the country. Besides space technologies is planned to be used more actively. Now the major task is to integrate numerous MIC subjects to corporate structures while the best plants and engineering bureaus must be integrated. The obsolete plants should be closed to prevent the waste of time and money.

Speaking about the losses, for the last period the biggest damage was done to the ammunition industry where there can be no production diversification and conversion.

T he scientific research potential has been practically completely preserved because the major scientific schools were preserved. On the other side the integration evokes correction of many technological chains’ structures, reduction of cooperation on particular productions. For example, in the strategic missiles design and production there was cooperation on sea- and ground-based strategic missiles. Two parallel cooperation chains involved more than forty thousand employees. For Russia this is superfluous. This cooperation can really involve 8-9 thousand employees. This figure  will be optimal. Thus proceeding to the new production level we look forward to ensure the defensive capability of the country in the most economical way. Another example is that today we have 28 civil and military aviation equipment factories. It is an evident surplus. Seven aircraft engines plants haven’t enough work. “Rybinskie motory”, the Moscow-based “Salut”, the plants in Perm and Ufa are in good condition. This is more than enough for production. The plants should be more strictly optimized on the base of Russia’s aviation development conception. The world goes to the creation of powerful integrated export-oriented structures such as “Boeing”, “Airbus Industry” and “Lockheed Martin”.

What is the share of the modern armaments in the army? Where are we strong, and where do we remain behind? What should be done to make up for what we have missed?

Under the different estimations there are eleven or seventeen technologies that define the arms development perspective. In the USA they believe there are seventeen such technologies, sometimes even twenty two technologies are being mentioned. Russia keeps its traditional leadership in nuclear and laser technologies. Traditionally we remain behind in computer science, microelectronics, materiology and some other fields.

Speaking about the armaments technical level, we are strong in tactical and fighter aviation, ground and sea-based attack facilities. We remain behind in guided weapons which require intellect, new element base, new target background researches. Though we have something in this field. “Russkaya avionika” is the most advanced in this sphere. The national mathematics allowed for them to come closer than anyone to creation of real multifunctional aircraft. Russia hasn’t lost its positions in armored vehicles and operational and tactical missiles. For example, “Iskander” complex won’t have equal analogues for ten-fifteen years. There are good missile carriers: “Proton”, “Rus”, “Tziklon”, “Molniya”.

Unfortunately, in certain periods the mistakes were made that caused a lag in small satellites. Seven years ago Gerbert Efremov (NPO Mashinostroenie) offered platforms for small satellites weighing till 1200 kg. The “Khrunichev” center and the Institutes of Heating Engineering also have good projects. I think the future is for small satellites that will stay in space for 8-12 years. We continue to operate big satellites that live from six months to three years. They cost much more expensive comparing to small satellites. The transition to small satellites will quickly increase space forces because every launch will give new quality in space.

One more problem – we don’t have formed military production volume. The current production level neither equals nor exceeds the number of the old armaments written off by the army. Generally having written off two hundred items of equipment we should produce the same amount. In reality we just ensure the technological maintenance now. There is no serial production, just the production of the single samples which cost twice more expensive than in large series. The serial production is to be started by 2003 or we’ll fail to provide the Armed Forces with necessary amount of armaments by 2010. First of all it refers to ships, aircrafts and strategic missiles but also to ammunition and small arms.

What do you think is the reason of the permanent crisis in all founded corporate MIC structures? Can the Chief of Armaments office somehow influence on the situation in the national defense industry?

Leaving alone Corporation “Antei”, all other corporations have been created artificially, for particular single project usually connected with large export order. For example, VPK “MAPO” was created for the Malaysian contract. Everybody was gathered in the strict governmental structure, a superstructure was created to operate finance flows. As soon as the project had been finished, the organization became useless and began to collapse. Since the major tasks were in the foreign economic activity, they forgot about modernization. And now VPK “MAPO” has no competitable offers on the market of light and medium fighter aircrafts therefore it took some steps tostart civil production as well. Generally the same situation is in AVPK “Sukhoi” but it isn’t so critical because of the large MTC contracts. While “Sukhoi” has foreign orders it will live. “Tochnost” by Arkadiy Shipunov can be mentioned as the good example but there everything also goes around export.

The Chief of Armaments office influences on the MIC corporate building processes through states orders. The general customers of the Ministry of Defense issue licenses and admit the industrial enterprises to participate in the state defense orders. Though it should be mentioned that the plants of non-defense branches also take part in realization of the state order.

Is Russia capable to create a light battle aircraft complex of the fifth generation that will compete with JSF? And should Russia create such fifth generation complex?

Yes, such aircraft should be created. But now neither designers nor producers can accomplish this difficult task alone. Therefore a Direction of perspective aviation programs should be founded to integrate the efforts of different design bureaues and plants to create battle aircraft equipment of the fifth generation. Many existing aviation design bureaues aren’t capable or competely lost the former potential for aviation equipment design. There are very few specialists on durability, aerodynamics, board equipment, aircraft weapons.

Thus to create the fifth generation fighter Russia must join the efforts of its whole aviation industry and science. The Ministry of Defense has organized the competition on light multifunctional aircraft. We will consider offered draft projects from different firms and then using one of them as a basis we will add to it the most interesting ideas form the others. The offers from OKB “Sukhoi”, KB “Yakovlev” and some others have already been preliminary considered. They showed some progressive ideas on aircraft design and technical level. Traditionally for the light fighter its weight won’t exceed 20 tons and it will successfully compete with JSF on “efficacy-cost” criterion.