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Eksport Vooruzheniy Journal
¹1, 1998 (January - February)
Once Some Indian Military Said: «We have Never Managed to Detect Submarines of Kilo Class»

 

Interview with Yury Nikolaevich Kormilitsyn, General Designer of Central Design Bureau of Marine Transport "Rubin"

Ruslan Pukhov
Director of AST Center


Yury Nikolaevich, tell us please, what is the number of project 877 EKM and 636 submarines sold from 1991 and which countries bought them?


The supplies of submarines of the above mentioned class have not begun in 1991, but in 1986. Today, taking into consideration recent purchasing of two submarines by the Indian Navy and two submarines of 636 project, 19 submarines of Kilo class have been sold. Therefore, already 19 submarines of Kilo class are sold abroad to India, Poland, Rumania, Algeria, Iran and China.


Could you specify the total value of these sales?


It is difficult to give an accurate figure, but since western countries, namely Germany, extremely overstate prices of their submarines, the value of our submarines also augmented, however, not so many times, as German submarines.


What is the Central Design Office "Rubin" part in profits earned and how submarines export earnings are distributed among financial and industrial group members ?


The question is very interesting and I am even ashamed to answer, because Central Design Office of MT "Rubin" obtains nothing form sales. It is very difficult to obtain something from manufacturer, while other organizations, involved in VTS get 5-7% from transactions. The designers obtain nothing.


Tell us, please, why the 877 EKM and 636 project submarines are not equipped with missile weapons. Perhaps this circumstance makes some problems with promotion this product on the world market ?


Russian fleet does not need missile weapons on submarines of this class. We have nuclear submarines, which carry the missile weapons required for execution of tasks fixed for our navy. Nevertheless, taking into consideration requirements of foreign customers and hundred per cent possibility of their realization in our plants, now, we have adopted 636 project variant, as well as the modernization of submarines 877EKM, which carry missile weapons of Club type. According to our information, this arm absolutely exceeds the guided weapon systems of Harpoon and Exocet types. The guided weapon system Club is developed by Ural production scientific union "Novator" and offered on the export market. The missiles launched from torpedo launchers under submersion conditions. The submarine ensures target designation without involvement of extraneous facilities. This system is the most powerful in its class, therefore, every time must be taken a political decision concerning acceptance of possible customers.


Kilo submarines DWT is very large. Isn't it a disadvantage ?


The fact is that its DWT corresponds to traditions of Russian submarine fleet and customer demands - Russia Navy. This is also according to designers traditions. Somewhat bigger DWT of the submarine in comparison with similar submarines of other countries is explained by the need to ensure its total floatability above water surface. Our vessels are divided into not two rescue zones, as western, but they are attributed to each compartment. Therefore, in an emergency each compartment with two adjacent side reservoirs can be completely flooded. In such situation the submarine remains afloat and can, using its own resources, return to its base or wait quietly for the arrival of rescue teams. All this has some impact on DWT increase. It is also necessary to admit that up to certain moment our defense industry manufactured equipment, especially electronic one, which in comparison with western models had distinctively larger volume and weight. But today this problem is solved and the DWT of the submarine of fourth generation of "Lada" class (export version "Amur") is six hundred tons smaller than that of Kilo of project 636, with TTE improved by several times.


What is the main differences between project 877EKM and 636 submarines ?


Platforms at these submarines of absolutely identical. They differ by the filling: 36 unit equipment were constructed for project 636, beginning at modernized sonar and ending with many converters, fans, main electric motor, diesel-altemator, motor of economic movement and many others elements. All just listed motors have smaller vibration, and consequently smaller noisiness, have the new depreciation, the high power, therefore the project submarine 636 has the maximal velocity 20 units and considerably smaller noisiness. Consequently, the project submarines 636 sees project submarines 877 D SOB on railway division several time as much of more than far.


What is the differences between the submarine of class "Amur" and the project 636 submarine?


In last two years we have already showed the submarine of fourth generation of "Lada" class and its export version "Amur". Their basic elements are known. The main difference comparing to non nuclear submarine "Amur" consists in the fact that absolutely all equipment and all materials (beginning from material of pressure hull) are newly manufactured in Russia. In the process none unit equipment is not created in the CIS countries. All is created on itself highest level with the use of most modem technologies, therefore we are included in the XXI century with new submarine, which there is no equal to.


Will "Amur" be equipped with anaerobic power systems ?


The project of such a variant is on schedule, but it is too expensive and it should be separately analyzed by the navy. Some elements of ADP installations are very expensive in manufacturing and operation. Any fleet cannot afford such arms. Many people now deliberate about it, although, the energetic on the basis of fuel cells is of course very promising in terms of efficiency coefficient and noiselessness. Unfortunately, the exploitation safety problems in such systems also are not solved in 100%. Although "Amur" in this version exists, we are not in hurry with production of it.


How do you evaluate "Amur" in comparison with competitor submarines, for example German Type-2009 ?


If we analyze attentively this submarine, we shall see, that it is worse even than our 636 project submarine, and this fact is known to everybody. It was actively and successfully sold all around the world thanks to intensive political and economical support of German administration. To sell such most complicated and costly product, as the submarine is, is very difficult. "Amur" is difficult to compare to something else. This submarine was designed ten years back, in this period adequate materials and equipment have been elaborated, the new structure was checked. It is enough to say only this - the combat effectiveness of submarines of fourth generation "Lada"/"Amur" will be three- four times higher than that of project 636 submarines of Kilo class.


There is an opinion that the development of new generation of armaments costs 7-10 times more than preceding. Is it true in case of Kilo submarine ?


This is not the case of fourth generation "Amur". The excessive price is not charged for the reason of scientific research, miniaturization and high cost of new equipment, although, all this, of course, is contributing, but simply because the developers take advantage of this legend of cardinal increase of technology price and the prices are artificially increased, therefore, chief and the general designers, as well as corresponding public bodies, have to wrestle with the rise of the prices for accessory equipment. We are being particularly concerned. Today we have already a healthy competition between enterprises, and if some contracting party does not suit us because of price, order performance deadlines and quality of work, then we replace it simply and solve these problems. It is important that such work be carried by all armament designers, let it be submarine, aircraft or tank designers.


What is your view of the role of platform in system of armaments. There is an opinion that its importance is decreasing, and the role of weapons and electronic subsystems in armament systems is growing?


This is an operational question. The platform of Kilo class submarine allows to install on it without special difficulties new armaments and new technological developments. In case of "Amur" all this is provided by design. Of course there are "fasionable" problems - technology of Stealth, for example, or AIP, but in each specific case it is necessary to look in it very attentively. If for an aircraft, a surface ship, a tank or an armoured carrier the application of Stealth technology is, in principle, actual problem, whereby for the submarine it is an obvious thing. Already for a long time, the submarines are designed in application of Stealth principle. The essence of submarine is excellently illustrated by its Russian initial name - concealed vessel. At first, its secrecy was ensured by a water layer. When the hydroacoustics entered in a powerful development, it became necessary to think about a submarine form, its anti-hydroacoustic coatings, vibration dumping, mechanisms of noisiness, a noisiness as a whole. Russian designers of submarines master the concept of acoustic design, i.e. the scientific approach, the system of rules and technical solutions, which ultimately should bring to maximal possible " invisibility " of submarine. All is included here: form, content, coating and tunnel diode. Russian designers are successful in it. Our submarines 877EKM and 636, and especially "Amur", are close to perfection. Nobody is able to detect "Amur" acoustic field, we will have a major problem even during measurements of its noisiness in polygon environment, in order to know its basic picture. Concerning other fields, like magnetic, this is not so simply to find the submarine under water, one have to comb all the territory, where, it is eventually hidden and to stamp on it. Therefore, I think that those who are being concerned with the antisubmarine warfare are looking for another ways of detection to be developed.


I was confronted by the following event. Eight years ago I was in Indium, with a visit of Western Fleet. After work, the Indian side prepared a promenade in steamship on the river. All guests were in civil cloths, nevertheless, they were in touch with defense problems. An Indian specialist came to me, subsequently as it turned out he was admiral, and said: "you know, Russia supplies us the very poor aircraft equipped with hydroacoustic sensors, which we toss for detection of submarines and each time we fail to find out submarines of Kilo class". I laughed and said: "for me this is a big compliment. I am Chief Designer of this submarine and I assure you that you will never detect it with any aircraft whatsoever ". After all we both agreed that the aircraft cannot be blamed, simply, the submarine is very secretive.


It is considered that Russian military-industrial complex is lagging behind western competitors in electronic systems. Is this problem solved, at present ?


We have lagged when Stalin has decided that "the cybernetics is a science of charlatans", and "the genetics - a prostitute of imperialism" These ideas have gained a subsequent development, and now we have pay for it. Now, also sometimes, someone tries to propagate equivocal ideas , about what should be developed or closed. This concerns, especially, undersea weapons and their components, and this is the most complex arm created by man. We are not prone to accept them readily. What concerns electronics, components base, we successfully solve problems.


What is your vision of the role of submarines in conflicts of future. Will it change?


The importance of submarines is growing and will be escalating namely because of their secrecy and might, as arms. Today the protection of coast and naval communications can be carried out cheaply with the help of submarines. The main conflicts of future are related to channels, islands and archipelagoes and namely submarines, especially equipped with CM arms, will be able to protect them.



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