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News archive


Eksport Vooruzheniy Journal
¹2, 1997 (June - July)
Elected are Few, or Trust Vector of the Military Industrial Complex «MAPO».

Ruslan PUKHOV,
 the director of the Centre of Strategies and Technologies Analysis (centre of AST)
 talks with 
general manager on strategic planning, marketing and information of 
the military industrial complex " MAPO ", 
A.I. Agueev


Alexander Ivanovich, what is the situation with potential supplies of MiG-29 fighters to Bulgaria?


Now we pass through the concluding stage of discussions on MiG squadron supply. But it is impossible to consider this project as only deliveries-related. It opens a broad spectrum of cooperation, including the repair and the modernization of MiG aircraft family, the production and delivery of spare parts. A package of already signed and prepared contracts are aimed at a capacity increase of Bulgarian aircraft building plant at Plovdiv, ensures the employment growth and entails a set of promising mutually advantageous programs. In particular, at our last meeting with Bulgarian partners, at the beginning of June, we agreed that we will dispatch a substantial quantity of MiG-21 for repair in Plovdiv plant.


Many Western and Russian experts are sure that the Bulgaria refusal of MiG fighters is definite and one should not come back to discussions about it. Do you agree with this opinion?


This is a false standpoint, presented in the article published in one of the Bulgarian newspapers. This article is denied at the beginning of April by the actual Prime Minister of Bulgaria S. Sofianskiy. The project "MiG for Bulgaria" in all completeness was reassessed during Russian-Bulgarian negotiations at the level of Prime Ministers. Consequently, the rumors about project death are strongly exaggerated.


Some experts affirm that MiG-29 had exhausted its export potential. Are you always relying on continuation of deliveries of machines of this class? What are the prospects of signature of contracts with Philippines, Indonesia, Austria and Malaysia?


MiG-29, as before, remains by the best aircraft in its class, continuously enriched in innovations. As a result - for the last 15 years, its combat effectiveness has increased three-fold, and there are considerable reserves for the further growth. Not accidentally MiG-29 became winners in NATO training combats held in Italy, in Germany and in France, as well as in South-East Asia and South African Republic. One should not forget also the factor of exclusive superiority of MiG-29 above all its analogs in terms of the cost-effectiveness. The proof of it are supplies to Malaysia, Hungary, Slovakia and Indium, delivered in the last three years. What concerns sometimes appearing estimations about MiG-29 degeneration, one should keep in mind an ancient saying : "called are many, elected are few". Truly professional forecasting experts are so few that it is possible to count them with fingers of one hand. They cannot afford themselves to formulate so doubtful estimations. The aircraft has wonderful market prospects for the next fifty years. These prospects are associated, among others with countries specified by you. It is difficult to forecast, on what day, in what week and month a next contract will be signed, but I hope that in the coming months or semesters we will be witnesses of signature of contracts. Naturally, there is a hard competition, and the competitors circle in the all presently declared tenders is rather restricted: F-16, F-18, "Mirage-2000-5", "Kvir".


When can be expected the MiG-35 release on the world market?


We will exhibit MiG-35 on the aviation exhibition in Farnborough, the next year, and then we intend to begin its serial manufacturing. On the basis of customer requirements, we can offer two kinds of products and services: a new fighter and in-depth modernizations of already available MiG-29. The possibility of such a choice ensures the winning marketing position, because we can offer an inexpensive modernization of MiG-29A supplied to many countries.


Why during Abu Dhabi Fairs in March of this year the MiG-29 was not exhibited, and K-50 was exhibited by GK "Rosvooruzhenie"?


MiG-29 is an aircraft sufficiently well known. Therefore, when participating in international exhibitions, we are guided by promotion prospects of this or that product on the specific market. In Abu Dhabi the combat helicopters were a priority and we found it usless to exhibit well known MiG-29. In respect of "Rosvooruzhenie", we are in partnership relations: we have the agreement on joint promotion of K-50 on international markets and some exhibitions and presentations we carry out in cooperation with them.


How can you explain the poor shooting scores of "Black Shark" on this exhibition?


I would not dramatize the results of its shootings. There were some failures with rockets, but this does not put any blame on the helicopter itself. The rockets can rust and they constitute parts separated from helicopter. What concerns the failures, they happen to anybody. So, during the last exhibition, there were problems with American tanks and at aerial defense systems "Patriot".


Why such a powerful structure, as the military industrial complex "MAPO", having the rights to independent access to foreign markets, cooperates with GK "Rosvooruzhenie"?


"Rosvooruzhenie" is an organization having a unique marketing potential. Therefore it is possible in their and our activities in a number of countries to find out common issues. For example, the contract with Malaysia has been signed by us with their involvement. It is quite possible, that in future we will sign the new joint contracts. In the first place we collaborate on K-50, because the "Black Shark" entered our nomenclature less than one year ago, and the technological backlog of "Rosvooruzhenie" is exceptionally precious for us.


Has the military industrial complex "MAPO" any possibility to lobby its transactions at the top management of the country, at higher legislative bodies, the ministries and the departments of Russia and intelligence services?


The lobbying is a very treacherous concept which has in many contexts a negative tint. First of all, we are the flesh of the flesh, and, secondly, our activity from the beginning to the end is is determined by a whole system of normative acts and all what we are doing remains in the main stream of the State policy. Therefore, it would not be correct to call our collaboration with this or other public body as a lobbying in strict meaning of this term. It would be more correct speak about a close working interaction.


Don't you consider, that the poor coordination and the absence of sufficient support from State organizations became the main reason of absence of new contracts in the recent period?


We cannot complain the absence of attention of State for our problems. Furthermore, it seems to me that sometimes we are flooding State bodies with our problems. In operations on external markets we feel the total support of necessary instances. And this quite natural, because each act of armament sales and supply of special services is an act of State's will. What concerns the absence of new contracts, the procedure of their conclusion takes usually two-three years, and some "oscillations" in transaction preparation is inherent to all our export economic activity.


In the numbers 4 and 5 of Jane's Intelligence Review it is reported that India is given the rights to produce some spare parts for MiG-29 with the exportation rights to the third countries. Don't you find, that this is crippling for VPK "MAPO"?


I don't know anything about such an agreement.


The similar scheme is applied partly also in Bulgarian contract, isn't it?


No, it is not. The contract provides for spare parts manufacture and the MiG-29 servicing at the Plovdiv factory only for the needs of Bulgarian Air Force, but the spare parts supply to the third countries concerns only MiG-21 and MiG-23 aircraft. And this seems to us economically justified.


In Western press appear regularly articles about low operational readiness of German Air Frce regiment equipped with MiG-29, as well as opinions of German pilots that MiG-29 is good only for close distance fights and proved to be bad in mock combats at middle range. Could you please comment these statements?


We prefer to evaluate MiG-29 regiment being a part of Luftwaffe, not on the basis of press articles but on cooperation protocols established between Germany and Russia. If to consider these protocols as a reliable information source, the operational readiness of MiG is maintained on a satisfactory level. The second statement is partly true, because MiGs constituting FRG legacy after unification with East Germany are the early models MiG-29A, and this opinion cannot be true for aircraft we now offer on export market, which is equipped with the new radar and the new rocket weapons increasing three-fold the combat potential of the present MiG-29, also in average-range combat.


In what situation is the program 1.42 and will the technologies of this program be applied in the fabrication of MiG-35?


MiG-35, as well as our prospective aircraft, known "in the world" under code 1.42, will be imparted with the "stealth" quality. Although it is impossible to make an aircraft absolutely imperceptible, even the slight reduction of its radar signature fundamentally improves its combat capabilities.



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